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The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and 
Wittgenstein 
 
Dawit Dame 
 
Introduction 
David Hume is well known for his skepticism on a 
wide range of topics, such as causation, the existence of a 
world external to the mind and the existence of an enduring 
self. As a result of this, the negative aspect of Hume’s 
philosophy often clouds the extent to which he wants to 
ground his epistemology in positive natural facts about 
humans. Wittgenstein never read Hume and nowhere is it 
evident that Hume had any influence on Wittgenstein’s 
works. Perhaps the only influence Hume had on 
Wittgenstein is simply being a philosopher of a certain 
tradition that Wittgenstein primarily sought to question. 
Wittgenstein like Hume, however, is committed the view 
that human knowledge, philosophical or otherwise, is 
ultimately grounded in natural facts about human beings.  
In this paper I will identify and discuss Hume’s and 
Wittgenstein’s naturalism and argue that both Wittgenstein 
and Hume seek to ground human knowledge on empirical 
natural facts about humans. In drawing the parallel between 
them, I will begin by discussing their respective negative 
views on knowledge and then focus on those positive views 
that in each case point towards a naturalism in their 
philosophy.  Since both Wittgenstein and Hume wrote on a 
wide range of topics, I will only focus on certain important 
aspects of their philosophy to serve as a tool for 
understanding their naturalistic philosophical projects.  I will 
particularly focus on Hume’s writing on causation and 
Wittgenstein’s view on understanding and rule following.  
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1. The Negative View 
1.1 Determine? 
I use the term “negative” primarily to serve as a 
general term to an aspect of Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy to what some might refer to as skepticism.1  The 
views discussed below are negative in a sense that they 
emphasize what is not rather than what is. Since the purpose 
of this paper is to discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s 
naturalism, I will briefly discuss some of their negative 
views only in so far as it serves to illuminate their 
naturalistic views.  To a large extent, very few consider 
Wittgenstein a skeptic, but skepticism is a term that is often 
associated with Hume’s writing on causality. I will briefly 
underline how Hume is not essentially a skeptic and how his 
naturalism is distinct from skepticism for Hume later on.   
An aspect of Hume’s philosophy that is considered 
negative is his view on causality, particularly, the inference 
from the observed to the unobserved.2 Hume in An Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding classifies “all object of 
human reason or inquiry” into two kinds: relation of ideas 
and matters of fact (E, 25).  He explains that relations of 
ideas are the kind that are demonstrative. Demonstrative in  
                                                
1 Wittgensteinian scholarship since the publication of Saul Kripke’s 
“Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”, has been divided into 
pre-Kripke and post Kripke analysis. It is fair to say that Kripke is the 
first to make an explicit analogy between Hume and Wittgenstein. 
However, his analogy that compares Hume’s skepticism along with his 
skeptical solution to Wittgenstein, has received wide array of criticism. 
My goal in this paper is to discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s naturalism 
with respect to their “negative” views, and I do not intend to address the 
finer points of a Kripkean comparison of the two.  
2 Barry Stroud, Hume (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977), 42. 
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the sense that their negation implies a contradiction. These, 
as Hume points out, are the type that we find in “sciences of 
geometry, algebra, and arithmetic”. For instance, the 
proposition “[t]hat the square of the hypotenuse is equal to 
the squares of the two sides…” (E, 25) is a form 
demonstrative reasoning. According to Hume, “the certainty 
and evidence of” the relation of ideas holds “ though there 
never were a circle or triangle in nature”. (E, 25). Matters of 
fact, on the other hand are propositions whose negation does 
not lead to a contradiction. A proposition that claims “[t]hat 
the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a 
proposition and implies no more contradiction than the 
affirmation that it will rise.” (E, 25-26).  
Hume asserts that “all reasoning concerning matter 
of fact seems to be founded on the relation of cause and 
effect”—after observing events of type A and type B, we 
infer B to follow from a single event A.  Essentially, 
multiple constant conjunctions between events form the 
basis of inference from an observed single event A to the 
unobserved event B. Hume points out that matters of fact 
reasoning by their very nature take the form of a chain of 
justifications. Within the realm of posteriori reasoning, a 
reason given for a certain event C is based on a fact B and 
the reason for the fact B is followed by a fact A.  A present 
event C is justified by a chain of inter-temporal reasoning 
that extends backward into the past.  A reasoning of this 
nature, therefore, relies on “the relation of cause and effect 
and that this relation is near or remote, direct or collateral.”( 
E. 27).  A reasoning of this kind is posteriori because one 
cannot establish the connection between cause and effect 
without necessarily having had an experience where a series 
of events A are followed by events B.  It follows logically 
that cause and effects could not be “discovered by a priori  
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arguments.” Therefore, “every effect is a distinct event from 
its cause” and any “conception” of its cause through a priori 
argument “must be entirely arbitrary.” (E, 29).   
What is at stake here is the idea of necessary 
connection between events A and B.  Hume wants to say 
that there is nothing to be discovered, even with the 
employment of demonstrative reasoning, that from an 
observed event A the unobserved event B necessarily 
follows. There is no necessary connection between a cause 
and its effect; it is impossible to infer any specific effect 
from just a single instance of the cause.  Only through 
repeated observations of events A being followed by events 
B can we infer B having observed A.  
Wittgenstein’s negative view could be illustrated 
based on instances of his views on understanding. The idea 
of rule following is embedded in what is considered human 
understanding. Our notion of understanding entails grasping 
a certain rule or direction and properly following it in all 
circumstances considered. But what does it really mean to 
understand, to follow a rule, Wittgenstein asks? Wittgenstein 
imagines a scenario where A is writing a series of numbers 
and B tries to guess what comes next by coming up with a 
formula: 
 
But are the processes which I have just described 
here understanding? “B understands the principle of 
the series” surely doesn’t mean simply: the formula 
“an=…” occurs to B. For it is perfectly imaginable 
that the formula should occur to him and that he 
should nevertheless not understand. “He 
understands” must have more in it than: the formula 
occurs to him. And equally, more than any of those  
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more or less characteristic accompaniments or 
manifestations of understanding. (PI 152). 
 
Here Wittgenstein points to an important aspect of 
what we take to be understanding.  The use of the word 
“occur” is supposed to signify that understanding might be 
thought of as a form of mental picture that comes to mind. 
However, this is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for understanding since it is imaginable that the 
formula could appear in his mind but he may not understand 
in the sense that the subject still might not be able to 
continue with the series. In short, the picture fails to 
determine his future use. Wittgenstein therefore considers 
the possibility that understanding must be more than the 
apparent “manifestations” or “accompaniments” of 
understanding, such as the occurrence of a formula in the 
head. The latter point is fleshed out in another passage: 
 
Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series 
is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? 
Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And 
infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited 
application of a rule. (PI 218). 
 
This picture of rules as rails is a metaphor that 
captures our ordinary conception of understanding of a rule. 
When we understand a rule, it is assumed that future 
applications of it could be read off, so to say, from it, the 
rails serving as future applications of the rule. Thus, we 
would be inclined to say that we can use a concept at any 
point in time tn  in the future. But how does a rule contain its 
application? Wittgenstein presents this perplexity in a rather 
‘absurd” situation where “a person naturally reacted to the  
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gesture of pointing “by looking in the direction of the line 
from the finger-tip to the wrist, not from the wrist to finger-
tip.”.  Signs like pointing with a finger, according to 
Wittgenstein, are apt to be interpreted and understood in an 
infinite number of ways; thus, signs, rules, concepts, 
formulas do not inherently contain their future applications.  
Could understanding be an interpretation of a rule? 
Wittgenstein retorts , “any interpretation still hangs in the air 
along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any 
support.”(PI 190). An interpretation is merely a substitution 
of one sign post for another. Interpretations stand in need of 
further interpretations leading to an infinite regress.  
Put simply, when it comes to understanding we are 
on our own. Understanding according to the above 
discussion is a kind of a jab in the dark for there is nothing 
about rules that determine our correct application of them at 
any point in time.  Just as Hume found no necessary 
connection between two events A and B, such that the 
occurrence of B is determined by the occurrence of A. 
Wittgenstein found nothing in the rule being followed that 
determines its future applications. “Thus, we think of future 
or possible use as present ‘in a queer way’, by being already 
contained in what the mind does when something is meant – 
in particular, by being conscious after the manner of an 
image.”3 Wittgenstein’s problem of meaning and 
understanding is thus summarized: 
                                                
3 Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning,(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1984), 9. Also consider this from Philosophical Investigations. “we say, 
for example, that a machine has(possesses) such-and-such possibilities 
of movement; we speak of the ideally rigid machine which can only 
move in such-and-such a away.—What is this possibility of movement? 
It is not the movement, but it does not seem to be the mere physical 
conditions, for moving either—as, that there is play between socket and 
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We are tempted to think that the action of language 
consists of two parts: an inorganic part--the handling 
of signs—and an organic part, which we may call 
understanding these signs, meaning them, 
interpreting them. These latter activities seems to 
take place in a queer medium, the mind. The 
mechanism of the mind-- the nature of which, it 
seems, we don’t quite understand—can bring about 
effects that no material mechanism could. (BB, p.3)  
 
Hume, however, departs from Wittgenstein in one 
major way. Hume believed that if a necessary connection is 
not to be found in the relation between objects, it is to be 
looked for, and perhaps be found in, human subjects. A 
careful empirical study of human psychology, Hume 
believed, would reveal the ground of this idea of causal 
determination. Hume thought that the empirical study of the 
human mind would reveal the origins of why we think that 
there is a necessary connection between events A and B. As 
the last sentence of the above quote indicates, Wittgenstein 
has a more radical form of negative view. He believes that 
even an empirical study of the human mind will not reveal 
the answer; it is a fruitless effort trying to find it in the 
“inner” as opposed to the “outer” material world.4 It must be  
                                                
pin not fitting too tight in the socket. For while this is the empirical 
condition for movement, one could also imagine it to be otherwise. The 
possibility of a movement is, rather, supposed to be like a shadow? And 
by shadow I do not mean some picture of the movement---for such a 
picture would not have to be a picture of just this movement. But the 
possibility of this movement must be the possibility of just this 
movement. (See how high the seas of language run here!)” 
 
4 Wittgenstein will not deny that there are natural, psychological 
associations we make in the realm of meaning and understanding. He 
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stressed, however, that Wittgenstein here has a Cartesian 
conception of the “inner” as opposed to the material 
mechanism by which the mind works as far as questions of 
understanding are concerned. Even an over emphasis of the 
latter is of grave concern to Wittgenstein.  
 
1.2 The Negative and its challenges 
Assuming that the negative view thus presented 
above paints a picture of skepticism, any attempt to answer 
Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s challenge must tell us why our 
reasoning takes the form it does at arriving at conclusions 
about causation, understanding and meaning. Moreover, a 
philosophically satisfactory answer to the question why must 
meet the following three conditions5: It must 
1. explain our unshakable conviction in our 
ordinary world view  
2. establish the impossibility of providing our world 
view with a rational justification 
3. explain 1 and 2 without making it appear that 
“our everyday conviction is hasty or dogmatic, or 
involves some kind of error, illusion, mistake, or 
make-believe.”6 
 
 
 
 
                                                
will disagree with Hume, however, in that the concept of understanding, 
the logical understanding is to be found in the mental. See. McGinn, 
Wittgenstein on Meaning, 4-5. 
5 These conditions have been adopted from Martin Bell and Mary 
McGinn, “Skepticism and Naturalism.” Philosophy, 65, No.254(1990), 
408. 
6 Ibid., 408. 
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2. The Positive View 
2.1 What do I mean by “naturalism”? 
Naturalism is a term employed in a variety of ways 
in philosophy.  It is difficult thus to find an all-
encompassing definition of naturalism in philosophy.7 In 
contemporary philosophy it is often used to align 
philosophical views with empirical science. What is 
essential about these definitions is that in all of them the 
word ‘naturalism’ denotes what could be investigated with 
our present scientific tools, in contrast to the “supernatural”.  
Outside these contemporary debates and in the spirit of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy I will attempt to find what 
naturalism means in the way it has been used in 
Wittgenstein’s and Hume’s writings.8 
Hume and Wittgenstein dedicate a large portion of 
their philosophy to addressing the negative challenge posed 
by their respective philosophies.  Within their philosophical  
                                                
7 For some of the debate in contemporary definitions of naturalism see, 
the debate between Quine and Stroud(W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology 
Naturalized." In Naturalizing Epistemology. Ed. by Hilary Kornblith( 
Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1994); Barry, Stroud "The 
Significance of Naturalized Epistemology." Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy vol. VI The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Ed. by 
Peter A. French et al. (Minneapolis MN: Minnesota Press, 1981) 
8 Wittgenstein often emphasized the use of words in ordinary language 
to mean different things at different times. Different usage of the same 
word created what he called family resemblances; family resemblances 
gave us a sense of what a word meant in general through a series of 
overlapping similarities. Consider the beginning of a speech he gave on 
Ethics to the London Heretics Society in 1929, “…And to make you see 
the subject matter of Ethics I will put before you a number of more or 
less synonymous expressions each of which could be substituted for the 
above definition, and by enumerating them I want to produce the same 
sort of effect which Galton produced when he took a number of photos 
of different faces on the same photographic plate…” 
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framework, they attempt to give a naturalistic explanation 
that is in accord with the above three requirements.  
Considered holistically this naturalistic view recognizes the 
limitations presented to our philosophical selves by our 
biological selves. As humans we are capable of observing 
the world “from outside” and at the same time 
unquestioningly follow nature. Hume recognized the 
limitations of being a human animal in his philosophy and 
sought to study the interaction between our animalistic and 
instinctual being and our reflective rational being. According 
to Stroud, “the real philosophical value of Humean study of 
human nature lies in neither position on its own, but in the 
illumination gained from the constant and inevitable passing 
to and fro between” nature and philosophy9. For 
Wittgenstein, the limitation is primarily manifested in the 
extent to which language could be used to serve the demands 
of philosophy. Some of the questions philosophy asks for 
are simply not linguistically feasible. After all, “a tea cup 
will only hold a tea cup full of water [even if] I were to pour 
out a gallon over.” 10 
Wittgenstein and Hume were both preoccupied with 
the question of precisely where this limitation is to be found 
in nature but it is also an area of difference between them. 
Wittgenstein holds the view that this limitation lies in our 
primitive capacity to be trained.11 Hume is interested in 
giving what Stroud calls a “causal theory about the origins 
of our beliefs in causality”. Hume’s theory is naturalistic in a  
 
                                                
9 Stroud, Hume, 249. 
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Ethics.” In  Philosophical 
Occasions, edited by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, (Indianapolis 
& Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 40.  
11 McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 168.  
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sense that he sought to find the answer regarding causality in 
the human subject.  
Let us take an instance of Wittgenstein’s writing to 
illustrate what is meant by “natural”. The most illuminating 
meaning of the word natural in Wittgenstein’s writing 
appears in Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. In a 
number of similar instances, Wittgenstein employs the word 
“natural” to emphasize its primitive and foundational 
characteristics. Wittgenstein, for instance, talks about a 
group of people engaged in creating arithmetic. Suppose that 
there is a technique for counting but not multiplication yet. 
Suppose also that these mathematicians invent multiplication 
for numbers up to 100. If a person well trained in the 
technique of multiplication, for the very first time, is asked 
to complete the multiplication of two numbers higher than 
100, say, 112 and 200, we assume that he will probably do 
what we would expected of him and produce the right 
answer. Wittgenstein goes on to say, “this is an 
experiment—and one which we may later adopt as a 
calculation.  What does that mean?  Well, suppose that 90 
per cent do it all one way. I say, “This is now going to be the 
right result.” The experiment was to show that the most 
natural (italics mine) way is—which way most of them go. 
Now everybody is taught to do it—and now there is right 
and wrong. Before there was not.” (LFM, 95).  
For Wittgenstein “naturalism” is the primitive 
behavior we exhibit in our untrained self and it lies on the 
surface. By “on the surface” I mean that given the 
multiplicity of meaning that could be derived from statement 
or a rule (the negative view) there is no ‘inner’ meaning that 
could be found in the rule. This idea has been well illustrated 
in, but not restricted to, his famous Private Language 
Argument. What essentially separates me, say, for a parrot,  
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is not some “queer” mental phenomenon that takes place 
inside my head when questions of understanding are raised. 
It is rather my ability to express meaning and understanding 
through use of examples and practical activities. Does this 
imply that the parrot could be made to behave like me if we 
train it? Wittgenstein’s answer would be no. A parrot does 
not have the natural capacities required for that form of 
training. By the same token, our “untrained” self would be 
one that meets the minimum requirement. He wants to 
divorce our association of knowledge, what determines 
correctness and incorrectness, from a private mental 
phenomenon. As to the question of how humans come to 
have this minimum requirement, he would leave it to 
biologist or the psychologist. 
The idea of naturalism for Hume, however, is to be 
found in the mental. If we cannot find the idea of necessary 
connection with two successive events, we must find it in 
the observer.12  
Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to 
the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary 
connexion, by their operation in particular instances, 
let us see, whether this idea be derived from 
reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be 
copied from any internal impression.(E, 64 )  
 
After observing two successive events A and B regularly, we 
form the idea of necessary connection in our mind; we form 
a belief. The process of forming this belief comes to us 
‘naturally’ because it is commonplace that “by the simple 
command of our will, we can move the organs of our body,  
                                                
12 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, (London: 
Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1949). 
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or direct the faculties of our mind.”(E, 64). Thus, we can say 
that one thing is ‘naturally’ related to another if the thought 
of the first leads to the belief that the associated second will 
‘causally’ follow.13  Resemblance, contiguity and causation 
produce association between two events in our mind. Upon 
encountering a picture of a friend, “our idea of him is 
evidently enlivened by the resemblance [and] in producing 
this effect, there concur both a relation and a present 
impression.”(E, 51). At the same time, proximity in space 
and time, contiguity, allows as to make an inter-temporal 
causal inference between two objects.  When I’m getting 
close to home, through contiguity, I can make the inference 
between my impressions of home (original idea) and my 
present state of mind, because contiguity affords me 
“superior vivacity” in understanding the causal interaction 
between the two. Consequently, Hume provides what he 
termed as the “natural” definition of cause and effect:  
 
A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to 
another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one 
determines the mind to form the idea of the other, 
and the impression of the one to form a more lively 
idea of the other. (T, 170).  
 
Most importantly, Hume wants to say that this 
“natural” definition of cause is equivalent to a 
“philosophical” definition of cause.14  For him, both are 
ways of “simply presenting a different view of the same  
                                                
13 Stroud, Hume, 89. 
14 Stroud, Hume; Robinson, “Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause””, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 12, No.47(1962);  Roberts, “Hume’s Two 
Definitions of “Cause””, The Philosophical Quarterly, 15, No.60(1965) 
doubt that he fully succeeds in equivocating these two. 
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object…[and] we may substitute [one for the other]”.(T, 
170).  
We may define a CAUSE to be ‘An object precedent 
and contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of 
precedency and contiguity to those objects, that 
resemble the latter. ‘( T, 170).  
 
The philosophical definition is supposed to 
encompass all “objective relations that hold between the 
things that we designate as causes and effects.”15 Hume’s 
attempt in equating these two definitions is consistent with 
his philosophical project of studying human behavior, 
including our philosophical behavior and finding 
explanations to philosophical questions in human 
psychology.  
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can 
hope for success in our philosophical researches, to 
leave the tedious lingering method, which we have 
hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then 
a castle or village on the frontier, to march up 
directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to 
human nature itself; which being once masters of, we 
may every where else hope for an easy victory. (T, 
introduction, XX). 
 
Hume sought to study the science of man grounded in nature 
and aspired to provide to philosophy what Newton did for 
science.16 He wanted to address philosophical questions not 
merely through “hypothesis”, but through the empirical  
                                                
15 Stroud, Hume, 88-89. 
16 Ibid. 
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study of humans in their natural habitat. If science 
formulates theories from simple hypotheses, such as what 
we commonly or naturally observe, then Hume might have 
reasoned that our natural behavior could provide us a way to 
formulate explanations of the relation between two events A 
and B related through resemblance, contiguity and cause-
effect.17 As sentient beings, we collect data through the 
senses and this immediate sensual input is what he called 
impressions. From these impressions we form ideas, 
impression accompanied by inference. Pure inferences that 
we derive from ideas are strictly speaking knowledge—the 
impossibility of perceiving anything differently.18 In Hume’s 
natural realm, there is nothing distinctly different about the 
two different definitions; they are both different ways of 
approaching the same subject without one being necessarily 
superior. Thus, Hume’s Naturalism formulates a 
fundamental, but empirical principle of the human mind: an 
observed constant conjunction between events A and B fixes 
a “union in the imagination” such that the thought of A 
naturally leads the mind to the thought of B.  
Questions of whether Hume’s two definitions of 
causes are “definitions” in the philosophically satisfactory 
sense of the word aside, an important point could be 
glimpsed here that draws a parallel with Wittgenstein’s idea 
of naturalism. If Wittgenstein had left his idea at the  
                                                
17 Robinson, Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause”, 165. 
18 Stroud, Hume,(78) says, “for every idea there must be an impression , 
or impressions, from which that idea is derived…” and that Hume 
searches of the source of the idea of necessary connection in the 
impression they could have been deduced from. However, Hume does 
not find impressions directly responsible for our ideas of necessary 
connection and concludes that the mind is “determined” to form the idea 
of necessary connection from repeated conjoined events.  
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doorstep of naturalism, then Hume’s job is to take it inside. 
In other words, Hume’s idea of naturalism sought to account 
for the psychological phenomenon Wittgenstein did not 
think worth going into. However, just as Wittgenstein 
thought that our natural disposition provides a foundation for 
mathematical theories and their subsequent criteria for their 
correct or wrong use, Hume also believed that the basis for 
the idea of a necessary connection is to be found in our 
naturally formed beliefs about association of events. Both 
agree that the answers to their negative views are to be 
found in our primitive epistemological behavior; the 
disagreement lies, if any, at the level of primitive-ness. In 
the sections below, I will develop this idea further and assess 
how it accounts for Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s negative 
views.  
 
2.2 How does Naturalism account for the problems 
raised in the negative view: 
The challenges posed by the negative view can be 
answered by arguing that 1.) It is nature not reason that is 
the ultimate foundation of all our factual beliefs, 2.) seeking 
a rational justification for our “naturalistic” reasoning is 
unwarranted, and 3.) we have an epistemic right to our 
naturalistic justifications. How does naturalism, as discussed 
above manifest, itself in addressing the negative concerns of 
Hume and Wittgenstein?  
 
2.2.1 Nature as a foundation of our factual beliefs 
It comes in a form of habit or custom that, after 
succession of similar events, we form an idea of necessary 
connection, according to Hume.  The precise mechanics of 
how this idea of necessity is formed lies in the tendency of 
the mind to be “determined” by such things as resemblance  
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and contiguity to form the idea of “necessity and power.”  
This creates “a great propensity[in the mind] to spread itself 
on external objects” and ascribe necessity to them. Necessity 
therefore is 
“…the effect of this observation, and it is nothing but an 
internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry 
out thoughts from one object to another.” ( T, 165) as well 
as, “..something that exists in the mind not objects; nor is it 
possible for us to ever to form the most distant idea of it, 
consider’d as a quality in bodies.”( T, 165-6).   
 
It must be noted that when Hume says that necessity is 
something that is found in the mind, neither does he mean 
that causality is strictly an ‘inner’ process and no such thing 
as causality in the world, nor that objects of the world are 
causally linked as a result of our minds.19  He means that 
certain mental processes get triggered in the mind, in the 
empirical sense, that ascribe necessity to objects.  
Hume makes an analogy between necessity and 
Lockean secondary qualities to reinforce his point that 
necessity is something that exists neither in the physical 
world nor in the mental.   
Thus, as certain sounds and smells are always found 
to attend certain visible objects, we naturally imagine 
a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and 
the qualities,  tho’ the qualities of such a nature as to 
admit of no such conjunction, and really exist 
nowhere.” (T, 167) 
 
According to Hume, when we get a “feeling of 
determination” from observed conjunction between events,  
                                                
19 Stroud, Hume, 81. 
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the mind projects itself on to the external world and this 
feeling of determination manifests itself in the form of 
necessity between two causal events. This is a fundamental 
fact about human nature.  
Wittgenstein will support Hume in saying that 
regularity determines our convictions in our beliefs.  A 
regular use of a word (or rule) determines its future 
application. “The repeated use that is required for there to be 
meaning is something spread out over time; meaning is, so 
to say, an essentially diachronic concept.”20  There are also 
numerous occasions where Wittgenstein talks about use, 
custom and practice as a foundation of knowledge and 
understanding. He believes that there are primitive 
instinctual faculties we posses before all knowledge of facts. 
The systemization of these primitive instincts establishes 
what we call “empirical facts”.  Our custom or habit is thus a 
systematic categorization of what is intelligible and what is 
not.  We begin to establish what is true and what is not from 
a collective system of what Wittgenstein frequently referred 
to as “a form of life”.  
“So you are saying that human agreement decides 
what is true and what is false?”—It is what human 
beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions 
but in form of life. (PI, 241) 
 
How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t 
seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about  
                                                
20 McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 37, draws on an interesting 
example of the “Two Minute England” taken from Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics to illustrate the point that a 
temporally truncated words like the “two minute England” are 
meaningless.  
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sensations every day, and give them names? But how 
is the connexion set up? This question is the same as: 
how does a human being learn the meaning of the 
names of sensations?—of the word “pain” for 
example. Here is one possibility: words are 
connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions 
of the sensation and used in their place. A child has 
hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him 
and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. 
They teach the child pain-behavior. (PI, 244) 
 
Groaning, moaning or crying are primitive pre-linguistic 
behavior that “the language-game with ‘pain’ is rooted, not 
in observation of private objects in an ethereal realm.”21 We 
don’t ask a child why he is crying we simply proceed to 
comfort him in the same way we do not question the 
unmannered behavior of an untrained dog.  Expressions such 
“I have hurt myself”, “He’s in terrible pain” develop as 
“learned extensions” of the manifestations of primitive 
natural behavior.  
 
2.2.2 Unwarranted rational justification of our 
“naturalistic” beliefs 
Both Wittgenstein and Hume provide their positive 
views by an explicit acceptance of the impossibility of 
providing a rational justification for their negative projects. 
What is more important is that the negative view is only a 
tool used to shift our attention to the positive view. 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus emphasizes that what is 
expressed in it is only a way, a “ladder” to be thrown away  
                                                
21 P.M.S Hacker, Wittgenstein Meaning and Mind (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), 192. 
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once we see “the world rightly”. This Wittgensteinian ladder 
is exactly the role given to their negative views; it is a way 
of forcing us see that the kind of factual justification we seek 
is mistaken.22  
At this juncture we can address the issue of whether 
Hume is essentially a skeptic and point out how his 
naturalism sets him apart from a thorough going skeptic.23 
At the end of the Treatise Book I part IV, Hume makes it 
clear that he is clearly not a skeptic.  
Shou’d it be here asked me…whether I be really one 
of those skeptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our 
judgment is not in any thing possesst of any measure of truth 
and falsehood; I should reply that that this question is 
entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person 
was ever sincerely of that opinion. 
Hume’s skepticism, especially with regard to 
causation and inductive reasoning could, at best, be 
described as “fallibilism”, the idea that our knowledge, in 
principle, could be mistaken. (One might also consider his 
critical stance on “metaphysics” a form of skepticism, 
which, it must be pointed out, is clearly different from 
philosophical skepticism).24 Consequently, Hume’s project, 
like Wittgenstein’s, put in the right light, is not one that is 
dedicated to providing an answer to a skeptical project, but 
is rather an attempt to make us see that epistemological  
                                                
22 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it must be pointed out, expresses 
quite a different view of Wittgenstein on language and knowledge from 
the one under discussion here.  
23 The discussion of Hume and skepticism requires a full-length paper. I 
will only provide a brief outline here.  
24 Morris, William Edward, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hume/>. 
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justification we are seeking is to be found in our naturalistic 
dispositions.  
Nature by an absolute and uncontrouble necessity 
has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and 
feel…Whosever has taken the pains to refute the 
cavils of this total skeptic, has really disputed 
without an antagonist, and endeavor’d by this 
argument to establish a faculty, which nature has 
antecedently planted in the mind, and render’d 
unavoidable.”(T, 183)  
 
In Wittgenstein’s positive system, the rejection of the 
negative view is followed by a careful nullification at what 
first appears like a skeptical problem. The controversy 
surrounding Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein 
(Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language) has to do, to a 
large extent, with whether Wittgenstein could be seen as 
espousing “skeptical” views. Both sides of the debate will 
agree that, if he did, it is meant to show the kind of 
meaningful questions that could be asked.  Bell and McGinn 
in Naturalism and Skepticism identify two essential 
characteristics of a negative challenge such as discussed 
above, which for convenience sake we can term as a 
skeptical challenge. The first of these is the skeptic’s 
inability to find an objective world in experience as a source 
of our knowledge, and the second of these is the skeptic’s 
identification of ordinary judgments as empirical claims that 
require independent evidence to be established as true. 
Wittgenstein finds these as a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the nature of ordinary practice. Wittgenstein repeatedly 
points out that the role of judgments in ordinary practice 
must not be taken out of context. It is easy fall into the trap 
of believing that “our system of judgments is uniformly 
epistemic.”  If I say, “I’m in pain”, I find myself confronted  
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with the same epistemic justification as  “I have a penny in 
my pocket”, two different claims that require different 
justifications.  
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes 
to an end;--but the end is not certain propositions’ 
striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of 
seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the 
bottom of the language-game.(OC, 204). 
 
Moreover, Wittgenstein thinks that answering to the 
skeptic’s challenge by looking for further evidence in 
experience is futile; it is to fall into the skeptics trap for 
experience itself is subject to many interpretations.  
One wants to say "All my experiences show that it is 
so". But how do they do that? For that proposition to 
which they point itself belongs to a particular 
interpretation of them. "That I regard this proposition 
as certainly true also characterizes my interpretation 
of experience." (OC, 145).  
 
The process of understanding or rule following then is not to 
be justified by appealing to a kind of justification that is 
independent of our ordinary practice and custom. To 
demonstrate our understanding is to engage in an activity 
such as pointing, giving examples, and acting in accordance 
with what is commonly accepted in a recognized language 
game. Understanding is a skill, just like swimming or 
playing chess, that is measured by how well we perform in a 
given circumstance.  
Hume goes at great length both in the Dialogues and 
Book I of the Treatise into proving that we are incapable of 
seeing the world outside our natural states as humans and we 
hold on to two fundamental beliefs: 1.) objects of our  
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perception have an independent persistent reality, and 2.) 
nothing comes to existence without a pre-existing cause. All 
skeptical doubts concerning the validity of these beliefs do 
not target the truth or falsity of them rather they demonstrate 
the absence of evidence for them, which is taken as a proof 
of dogma. Hume believed that we lacked complete 
knowledge of the ultimate reality and the skeptical doubts 
carry no more weight than our naturalistic beliefs.25 The 
employment of reason to justify or nullify our belief 
“diminish [each other]…till at last they both vanish away 
into nothing by a regular just diminution.”(T, 187).  Thus, 
the negative view’s challenge is merely a pedantic 
requirement to qualify our naturalistic beliefs, and as far as 
our custom goes it is unwarranted.  
  
 
2.2.3 Epistemic right to naturalistic beliefs  
It follows from the above discussions that if 
justification is to be grounded in ordinary practice, we have 
an epistemic right to our system of judgments. The 
naturalistic view of Hume and Wittgenstein is thus an 
attempt to preserve our ordinary system of justification. 
Norman Smith Kemp in defending Hume’s naturalism states 
that “what we call ‘reason,’ and oppose to our natural beliefs 
is in reality nothing distinct from these beliefs; it is just the 
de facto necessity we are under of following them, which 
gives rise to the philosophical or ‘rational’ reaction against  
 
                                                
25 Norman Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume(I.).” Mind, New Series, 14, 
No. 54 (1905), 166.   
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them.”26 When we discard Hume’s naturalistic beliefs, we 
devolve into a Berkeleyian idealist where nothing exists 
outside the mind.  When we take them too seriously, they 
lead us to “idle speculation” fueled by knowledge 
demanding a sufficient cause for all things.  
This does not mean that Hume wants to throw away 
our rational way of seeking knowledge. He accepts that there 
is part of our existence that we share with animals and then 
there is a part of us that is rational, reflective, and 
introspective. The latter is to serve the former; it is to guide 
us in our quest for knowledge. Having the right to 
knowledge claims of the kind discussed above should not 
deter us from seeking true knowledge. This for Hume 
requires adapting a “two-fold philosophical discipline: a 
skeptical discipline to open [our] eyes to the deceptiveness 
of the mistaken endeavors of [the mind] and a positive 
naturalistic philosophy to mark out the paths upon which 
[we] can confidently travel without any such attempted 
violation of [our] human nature, and in furtherance of [our] 
essential needs.”27 
Language games are the key to Wittgenstein’s 
naturalistic epistemology. Language games are to serve as a 
reference to what we can consider as correct and incorrect.  
Wittgenstein’s slogan “don’t think but look” is really an 
attempt to draw out attention back to a natural way of 
justifying and knowing as opposed to a “supernatural” 
(Platonic) way of looking an underlying reason to be found 
by a rigorous “thinking” devoid of ordinary practice.  As 
Bell and McGinn rightly point out the non-rational base of 
our ordinary judgment has a particular role to play in our  
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 132.  
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system of knowledge and that is practicality. “These 
judgments have been shown to have a role in our practice 
that makes the question of establishing them, justifying 
them, completely out of place.”28  
Evidently, both Hume and Wittgenstein were very 
critical of a particular way of doing philosophy. 
Wittgenstein opposed the Platonic sense of meaning and 
essence independent of our practice. He is often quoted for 
saying that philosophy does not provide thesis (and he did 
try not to have a thesis). The task of the philosopher is 
perhaps to clear up the mess and rearrange the some of the 
clatter and mess created by our practice, but not to discover 
truth. Hume has stressed that we should treat philosophy in 
“a careless manner” and markedly differed from his British 
predecessors in the way he approached ontology, 
epistemology and ethics.  
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